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Abstract:  
The existence of rape myths in the social consciousness and their potential to affect juror 
deliberations in rape trials is well-documented. Thus, it is increasingly likely that trial judges 
will wish to seek to counteract the negative effects of these myths when directing the jury in 
rape trials. For trial judges who wish to do this, there is a real challenge in seeking to educate 
jurors whilst at the same time providing a balanced direction. This article addresses ways in 
which Irish trial judges may be assisted so as to enable them to warn the jury of the erroneous 
nature of prevailing stereotypes about sexual offences without unfairly prejudicing the 
defendant’s case. 
 
Introduction  
Summing up in any criminal trial is  challenging.  The judge faces a difficult task in seeking 
to explain legal intricacies to the jury in a way in which they understand. Even the 
explanation of the beyond reasonable doubt standard can be problematic. In a rape trial, the 
task of a trial judge is even more difficult. The nature of sexual offences means that the 
evidence itself is often difficult to summarise without prejudice. For example, a trial judge 
may be obliged to draw attention to the fact that the evidence of the complainant is largely 
uncorroborated and that it is largely the complainant’s word against the defendant’s.2 The 
slightest slippage in language here or clumsy phrasing could serve to undermine the 
complainant’s version of events. However, over and above these problems, an emerging issue 
is that of rape myths and their potential impact on juror deliberations. It is well-accepted now 
that stereotypical attitudes about rape can prejudice jury deliberations. For example, leading 
scholar on sexual offences, Tom O’Malley  opens his seminal text on sexual offences with 
                                                          
1 BCL LLM PhD, Lecturer in Law, University of Limerick. This article is based upon a paper which was 
presented by the author at the North South Criminology Conference at University College Cork on June 20, 
2013. The author would like to thank Professor Shane Kilcommins and Dr. Mary Donnelly, Law Department, 
University College Cork for comments on earlier drafts of the material contained in this article. The views 
expressed, as well as any errors contained within, remain the sole responsibility of the author.  
2 The trial judge has a discretion to give a corroboration warning in a rape trial: section 7 of the Criminal Law 
(Rape) Amendment Act 1990. 
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the statement that ‘the study of sexual offences is in many ways a study of social values.'3 
Trial judges who wish to try to off-set the negative effects of such attitudes  when summing 
up for the jury face a challenge if they are going to try to do this fairly without unduly 
interfering with, or further prejudicing, the jurors’ deliberations.  
 
This article addresses the obstacles which trial judges may face in this area. The problem 
which exists regarding societal attitudes to rape and how they affect juror decision-making 
will be discussed. The potential difficulties for trial judges who may wish to tackle these 
attitudes when summing-up for the jury will then be assessed. This is done with reference to 
the English case of R v D4 which demonstrates the dangerous territory a judge may find 
him/herself in when trying to educate jurors about the reality of sexual violence in an ad hoc 
or unguided manner. The article concludes  by outlining a method of guiding judges on how 
to sum up effectively without prejudicing the jurors.   
 
The Problem: Societal Attitudes and their Effects on Juror Decision-Making  
Empirical research on attitudes to sexual violence is somewhat limited. The two primary 
available studies in this jurisdiction are the SAVI Report5 and a study conducted by the Irish 
Examiner newspaper in 2008.6 SAVI involved anonymous telephone interviews with 3,000 
randomly selected adults from the general population in Ireland. Although the primary aim of 
this study was to estimate the prevalence of various forms of sexual violence amongst Irish 
women and men, there was also some assessment of public perceptions and beliefs about 
sexual violence. In the Irish Examiner study, 1,002 adults were questioned about their 
attitudes and beliefs about rape. 
 
                                                          
3 O’Malley, Sexual Offences: Law, Policy and Punishment, (Dublin: Round Hall, Sweet & Maxwell, 1996), p. 1. 
Similar sentiments have been expressed in an Irish context: Fennell, “Criminal Law and the Criminal Justice 
System: Woman as Victim” in Connelly, Gender and the Law in Ireland, (Dublin: Oak Tree Press, 1993), p. 
153; McCullagh, Crime in Ireland: A Sociological Introduction, (Cork: Cork University Press, 1996) and; Ring, 
“Trial and Error: Current Problems in the Trial of Sexual Offences: A Prosecutor’s Perspective” (2003) 13 Irish 
Criminal Law Journal 3 at 5.  
4 [2008] EWCA Crim 2557. 
5 McGee et al, The SAVI Report: Sexual Abuse and Victimization in Ireland, (Dublin: The Liffey Press, 2002). 
6 Ryan, “Rape: Our Blame Culture”, Irish Examiner, March 26, 2008. 
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There is some evidence that members of the public are aware of the realities of rape and are 
sympathetic towards rape complainants. In SAVI, 84.6 per cent of women and 85.6 per cent 
of men agreed that a raped woman was usually an innocent victim.7 In addition, 81.8 per cent 
of women and 82.9 per cent of men agreed that most rapes are carried out by someone known 
to the victim.8  Finally, 93 per cent of women and 92 per cent of men believed that date rape 
was just as serious as rape by a stranger.9 However, there is also evidence of a level of rape 
myth acceptance. For example, in SAVI, 37.9 per cent of women and 42.3 per cent of men 
thought that allegations of rape are often false.10  Given that the research indicates that false 
allegations of rape are rare occurrences, this belief would appear to be out of step with reality. 
Stereotypes about ‘real victims’ also appear to hold some influence in the Irish 
consciousness. The Irish Examiner study revealed that 23 per cent of respondents believed 
that a woman was partially or totally responsible for being raped if she previously had had 
many sexual partners.11 There also appears to be a tendency to trivialise the rape of a sexually 
experienced complainant. In SAVI, 18.3 per cent of women and 23.8 per cent of men believed 
that sexually experienced people are less traumatised by rape.12   
 
Victim behaviour at the time of the alleged incident also appears to affect perceptions as to 
whether a sexual offence has occurred. In the Irish Examiner study, 33 per cent of 
respondents felt that a woman who had consumed alcohol or taken illicit drugs is partially 
responsible if she is raped. 8 per cent thought that she is totally at fault.13  37 per cent of 
respondents in the Irish Examiner study felt that flirting extensively with the defendant made 
a woman in some way responsible for any subsequent attack.14  A victim’s mode of dress at 
the time of the incident also attracts attention. In SAVI, 29 per cent of respondents thought 
                                                          
7 McGee et al, The SAVI Report: Sexual Abuse and Victimization in Ireland, (Dublin: The Liffey Press, 2002), p. 
157. 
8 McGee et al, The SAVI Report: Sexual Abuse and Victimization in Ireland, (Dublin: The Liffey Press, 2002), p. 
157. 
9 McGee et al, The SAVI Report: Sexual Abuse and Victimization in Ireland, (Dublin: The Liffey Press, 2002), p. 
158. 
10 McGee et al, The SAVI Report: Sexual Abuse and Victimization in Ireland, (Dublin: The Liffey Press, 2002), 
p. 158. 
11 Ryan, “Rape: Our Blame Culture”, Irish Examiner, March 26, 2008. 
12 McGee et al, The SAVI Report: Sexual Abuse and Victimization in Ireland, (Dublin: The Liffey Press, 2002), 
p. 158. 
13 Ryan, “Rape: Our Blame Culture”, Irish Examiner, March 26, 2008. 
14 Ryan, “Rape: Our Blame Culture”, Irish Examiner, March 26, 2008. 
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that women who wear short skirts or tight tops are inviting rape.15  Similarly, in the Irish 
Examiner study, 26 per cent of respondents felt that a woman who was raped while wearing 
sexy or revealing clothing was in some way responsible for rape.16  Thus, it seems that there 
is a societal readiness to blame victims for being raped or sexually assaulted if they have not 
adhered to certain standards of behaviour. 
 
Consequently, although the findings of SAVI suggest that there is a level of understanding of 
the reality of sexual violence in Ireland, the report also reveals a degree of rape myth 
acceptance that is mirrored by the Irish Examiner study. While further research in this area is 
necessary in order to ascertain more precisely the level of adherence to rape myths which 
exists in Irish society, it appears safe to conclude that there is a proportion of society which 
subscribes to stereotypical thinking about sexual offences. Indeed, Ellison and Munro suggest 
that the level of rape myth acceptance in a society may be even higher than attitude surveys 
suggest.17  In their view:  
 
“Participants who respond to questionnaires may be well-versed in the socially 
“appropriate” attitudes to be voiced at this abstract level, and so may present a 
progressive profile to the researcher than they in fact endorse.”18  
 
Consequently, it is necessary to be alive to the fact that attitude surveys may not reveal the 
full extent of rape myth acceptance in Irish society. If these attitudes exist in society, it is 
likely that juries in rape trials will contain jurors who are influenced by stereotypical thinking 
about rape. It is not difficult to imagine how such attitudes might prejudice their 
deliberations.  
 
                                                          
15 McGee et al, The SAVI Report: Sexual Abuse and Victimization in Ireland, (Dublin: The Liffey Press, 2002), 
p. 158. 
16 Ryan, “Rape: Our Blame Culture”, Irish Examiner, March 26, 2008. 
17 Ellison and Munro are writing about English attitude surveys. However, there is no reason to believe that their 
comments are not equally applicable in an Irish context.  
18 Ellison and Munro, “A Stranger in the Bushes, or an Elephant in the Room? Critical Reflections upon 
Received Rape Myth Wisdom in the Context of a Mock Juror Study” (2010) 13 New Criminal Law Review 781 
at 799. 
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Effect of Societal Attitudes on Juror Deliberations 
Since research with real juries is prohibited in Ireland19, the only way of gathering 
information on jury deliberations is through mock jury research. In a mock jury study, the 
participants are asked to put themselves in the role of jurors and to make judgements about 
hypothetical cases which are presented to them in various forms. A number of these mock 
jury studies have been carried out in England.20 These studies have shown that jurors are 
significantly affected by societal context when deliberating in rape trials.  
 
A study conducted by Temkin & Krahé showed that jurors were more convinced that a 
defendant should be held liable and blamed the complainant less in stranger rapes than in 
rapes by acquaintances, and in particular, rapes by ex-partners.21 A study carried out by 
Ellison and Munro also strongly suggested that claims of non-consensual sex that are not 
accompanied by evidence of physical force and attendant resistance are significantly less 
likely to be accredited as rape by jurors.22 Jurors have also been found to be critical of 
complainants who were intoxicated at the time of an alleged incident of non-consensual 
sexual activity. A study by Finch and Munro found that women who consume alcohol in the 
presence of a male drinker will be perceived to be more sexually available than a non-
drinking counter-part. Even in situations in which the complainant’s intoxication was not 
wholly voluntary (i.e. where her drink was spiked with additional alcohol or the defendant 
coerced her into drinking greater quantities than she intended) the complainant was 
frequently viewed as being partially responsible.23 
                                                          
19 Research on the deliberations of juries is prohibited under both international and domestic law. The European 
Court of Human Rights has held that jury deliberations should be secret: Gregory v United Kingdom (1997) 25 
EHRR 577, para. 44. At a domestic level, in O’Callaghan v Attorney General, O’Flaherty J stated that the 
deliberations of a jury should always be regarded as completely confidential: [1993] 2 IR 17 at 26.  
20 Finch and Munro, “Breaking Boundaries? Sexual Consent in the Jury Room” (2006) 26 Legal Studies 303; 
Ellison and Munro, “Reacting to Rape: Exploring Mock Jurors’ Assessments of Complainant Credibility” 
(2009) 49 British Journal of Criminology 202; Ellison and Munro, “Of ‘Normal Sex’ and ‘Real Rape’: 
Exploring the Use of Socio-Sexual Scripts in (Mock) Jury Deliberation” (2009) 18 Social & Legal Studies 291; 
Ellison & Munro, “Turning Mirrors into Windows? Assessing the Impact of (Mock) Juror Education in Rape 
Trials” (2009) 49 British Journal of Criminology 363.  
21 Temkin and Krahé, Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap: A Question of Attitude, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2008), p. 120. 
22 Ellison and Munro, “Reacting to Rape: Exploring Mock Jurors’ Assessments of Complainant Credibility” 
(2009) British Journal of Criminology 202 at 206. 
23 Finch and Munro, “The Demon Drink and the Demonized Woman: Socio-Sexual Stereotypes and 
Responsibility Attribution in Rape Trials Involving Intoxicants” (2007) 16 Social & Legal Studies 591 at 599. 
These results mirror the findings of an earlier pilot study by the same researchers: Finch and Munro, “Juror 
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It is necessary that mock jury research be commissioned in Ireland in order to shed further 
light on the extent to which jury deliberations in Irish rape trials are influenced by societal 
context.  Such research would provide an insight into the influence which societal context has 
upon Irish jurors’ deliberations in rape trials. However, in the absence of such research, we 
must rely on the information which is currently available to us.  This research indicates both 
the existence of rape myth acceptance in Irish society and the potential for such stereotypical 
attitudes to impact upon juror deliberations in rape trials.  
 
The Potential Dangers for Trial Judges who seek to ‘Educate’ Jurors about the Reality 
of Sexual Violence  
The need for caution in the phrasing of judicial directions was demonstrated in the case of R v 
D.24  The case involved a series of rapes within a relationship. The final incident of rape 
occurred on the 13th of January 2006. On that evening, a separate incident in the household 
resulted in the police being called. While the police were in the house, the complainant did 
not complain about sexual assault or rape. Rather, she complained on the 15th of January 
when a policeman came to take her statement about the separate incident which had occurred 
on the evening of the 13th. Part of the defence case had been that the delayed complaint was 
evidence of fabrication by the complainant and she was cross-examined as to why she had 
not complained when the police were in the house on the 13th. Her response was that she 
would not have been comfortable making her complaint at that time when there were so 
many police officers present. She testified that she had felt ashamed of what had happened 
and it was only when she was speaking with the policeman on an individual basis on the 15th 
that she felt able to make her complaint.25 
 
In summing up for the jury, the trial judge sought to explain to them why a complainant in 
this complainant’s situation might not complain immediately. He began by stressing the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Stereotypes and Blame Attribution in Rape Cases Involving Intoxicants: The Findings of a Pilot Study” (2005) 
45 British Journal of Criminology 25. 
24 [2008] EWCA Crim 2557. 
25  [2008] EWCA Crim 2557, para. 4. 
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difference between rape and other criminal offences such as a burglary or an assault. He also 
sought to stress the particular difficulties which a complainant might face in relation to 
reporting when the defendant is someone s/he had been in a relationship with. In order to 
provide context for the appeal, it is worth quoting at some length from the trial judge’s 
direction to the jury: 
 
“Very often, women who are raped within relationships feel ashamed of what’s 
happened. They themselves feel the shame. Although they have nothing to be 
ashamed about, because they are the victim, that’s the reaction. …They are often too 
traumatised or embarrassed to tell anyone what’s going on, and a very serious aspect 
of the offence in those circumstances is that a woman feels trapped. She is, after all, in 
her own home, very often simply too ashamed and embarrassed to tell anyone that the 
person she has brought into her home to share her life, to be with her children, is now 
raping her. She won’t tell her neighbours, friends, even very close friends or children, 
still less the police, because of those factors...”26 
 
“So it’s against that background that you may wish to consider the question: why D 
didn’t complain about being raped when it started. …Bear in mind how you would 
feel if you were in her situation about suddenly saying: ‘Oh, by the way, I’ve been 
raped’. This is where you use your commonsense and your experience of life in 
determining that question, because it’s frequently said when women don’t complain 
about rape: ‘well it’s not true, because if it had been true they would have been 
straight down to the police station hammering on the door, saying “I’ve been raped”.’ 
But you may think it doesn’t work like that particularly if it’s rape by someone you 
have loved, as D says, still care about, to an extent, in your home, where your children 
are living.”27 
 
The defendant was convicted of rape. He appealed his conviction on the basis that the trial 
judge’s direction to the jury was “seriously unfair”.28 The Court of Appeal commented that a 
judge “is entitled to make comments as to the way evidence is to be approached particularly 
in areas where there is a danger of a jury coming to an unjustified conclusion without an 
appropriate warning”.29  However, Latham LJ stressed that any comment made must be 
“uncontroversial”.30  The problem with this trial judge’s direction was that his comments 
                                                          
26  [2008] EWCA Crim 2557, para. 5. 
27  [2008] EWCA Crim 2557, para. 5.  
28  [2008] EWCA Crim 2557, para. 6. 
29 [2008] EWCA Crim 2557, para. 11. 
30 [2008] EWCA Crim 2557, para. 11. 
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lacked balance and the direction was not appropriately measured. Fortunately, the conviction 
here was allowed to stand as the defence case was fully and fairly put to the jury in every 
other respect.31 However, the case is a demonstration of the need for caution on the part of 
trial judges who are attempting to offset prejudicial thinking by way of jury directions. If 
appeals are to be avoided, it is very important that the wording of these directions is 
measured. Commenting on this case, Kibble has stated that if myths and stereotypes are to be 
articulated and confronted, it is important that they are articulated and confronted with 
precision.  Otherwise, the old myths will simply be replaced by new myths.32  To illustrate 
his point, Kibble uses the myth that women cry rape when they regret having sex or want 
revenge. As Kibble points out, a bald statement that a woman would never cry rape as a result 
of regret or in order to exact revenge would be equally untrue.33  For a judge to make such a 
statement would merely serve to create a counter-myth to replace the original myth. Such an 
outcome would be undesirable and merely shift the unfairness from complainants to 
defendants. Thus, it is very important that jury directions are carefully worded and 
sufficiently nuanced to avoid the creation of further bias in jurors. 
 
Providing Support for Judges when Summing-Up 
Given the potential for trial judges to err when seeking to off-set the effects of rape myth 
acceptance on juror deliberations, it is necessary to support them in their endeavours and 
minimise the risk of prejudice. Of course, there are a number of legislative measures which 
could aid trial judges when directing the jury. For example, the introduction of a legislative 
definition of consent could help with explaining what is necessary for a valid consent to 
sexual activity. Similarly, increased guidance on the appropriate use of corroboration 
warnings could direct judges on when it is appropriate to give such warnings and the form 
which these warnings should take. A full discussion of legislative measures such as these is 
beyond the scope of this article. Rather, the discussion here will focus on extra-legal 
measures which might aid trial judges when directing the jury, namely the introduction of 
model jury directions and judicial training.   
 
                                                          
31 [2008] EWCA Crim 2557, para. 13. 
32 Kibble, “Case Comment” [2009] Criminal Law Review 591 at 597. 
33 Kibble, “Case Comment” [2009] Criminal Law Review 591 at 597. 
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The English approach to the provision of model jury directions for use in sexual offence trials 
provides an excellent template which should be followed in Ireland. In the wake of the 
enactment of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, the Judicial Studies Board in England issued 
some guidance for judges as regards appropriate directions to be given regarding consent in 
sexual offence cases.  As part of its function, this Board publishes bench books and specimen 
directions which trial judges may use in order to direct juries on the performance of their 
duties.34 The Crown Court Bench Book, published by the Judicial Studies Board in March 
201035, provides guidance for judges when directing the jury and contains a chapter on sexual 
offence cases.36 The Bench Book does not provide for specimen directions per se. Rather, it 
provides model directions which show trial judges how to guide juries but at the same time 
allow for trial judges to tailor the directions as they see fit in order to suit the case at hand.37 
The Bench Book provides guidance for judges who need to direct jurors in relation to the 
danger of assumptions based on stereotypical attitudes; allegations of historical sexual abuse; 
evidence of child witnesses and; consent, capacity and voluntary intoxication.  
 
In relation to the guidance which the Bench Book provides for judges on how to alert the jury 
to the danger of stereotypical assumptions, it is observed that stereotypes about appropriate 
victim behaviour or ‘real rape’ do not accord with judges’ experience.38 The Bench Book 
acknowledges that increasingly where a judge feels that such stereotypes may affect the 
jury’s deliberations in a case, s/he may take the decision to caution the jury regarding the 
dangers of relying on unwarranted assumptions.39 In this respect, the Bench Book 
recommends that the giving of such a warning should be discussed with counsel for the 
prosecution and the defence prior to the closing speeches and stresses the need for judges to 
ensure that they do not stray from the commonplace to the controversial and, thus, appear to 
                                                          
34 The Judicial Studies Board was replaced by the Judicial Council in April 2011.  
35 Judicial Studies Board, Crown Court Bench Book: Directing the Jury (Judicial Studies Board, 2010). The 
bench book can be accessed at the following link: 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Training/benchbook_criminal_2010.pdf (last accessed: 
August 20, 2013).  
36 Judicial Studies Board, Crown Court Bench Book: Directing the Jury (Judicial Studies Board, 2010), chapter 
17. 
37 The Judicial Studies Board has expressed a desire to move away from standard directions and to instead 
emphasise the responsibility of each individual judge, in each individual case, to craft decisions appropriate to 
that case: Judicial Studies Board, Crown Court Bench Book: Directing the Jury (Judicial Studies Board, 2010), 
p. v.  
38 Judicial Studies Board, Crown Court Bench Book: Directing the Jury (Judicial Studies Board, 2010), p. 356.  
39 Judicial Studies Board, Crown Court Bench Book: Directing the Jury (Judicial Studies Board, 2010), p. 353.  
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be endorsing arguments for one side at the expense of the other.40  Thus, comments should be 
general and balanced and should not tend to support or prejudice either the complainant or 
the defendant. While the Bench Book does not set out any precise format which a judge must 
use if s/he wishes to warn the jury of the danger of relying on assumptions, it does provide 
nine ‘illustrations’ which in essence amount to sample directions which judges may adapt for 
use in relevant cases.  
 
Examples of the illustrations provided for in the Bench Book include guidance on: the 
avoidance of assumptions when the complainant and defendant are known to one another; the 
effect of trauma and demeanour in evidence; late reporting; absence of force or the threat of 
force and; the avoidance of assumptions which are based on what is perceived to be 
inappropriate victim behaviour.  In order to demonstrate the format of these illustrations, it is 
worth citing in full the general illustration regarding the avoidance of judgements based on 
stereotypes:   
 
“It would be understandable if one or more of you came to this trial with assumptions 
as to what constitutes rape, what kind of person may be a victim of rape, what kind of 
person may be a rapist, or what a person who is being, or who has been, raped will do 
or say. It is important that you should leave behind any such assumptions about the 
nature of the offence because experience tells the courts that there is no stereotype for 
a rape, or a rapist, or a victim of rape. The offence can take place in almost any 
circumstances between all kinds of different people who react in a variety of ways. 
Please approach the case dispassionately, putting aside any view as to what you might 
or might not have expected to hear, and make your judgement strictly on the evidence 
you have heard from the witnesses.”41  
 
Guidance such as this offers a useful means for judges to warn the jury about the danger of 
assumptions without being controversial or biased. The direction alerts the jury to the fact 
that assumptions may affect their deliberations whilst avoiding prejudice in the form of 
suggestion of alternative “correct” assumptions which should guide their reasoning. For 
example, the direction does not attempt to educate juries about the “reality” of sexual offence 
                                                          
40 Judicial Studies Board, Crown Court Bench Book: Directing the Jury (Judicial Studies Board, 2010), p. 356.  
41 Judicial Studies Board, Crown Court Bench Book: Directing the Jury (Judicial Studies Board, 2010), p. 357. 
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cases (e.g. that they are more likely to be committed by individuals who are known to the 
complainant or that the alcohol is a common feature of these cases). 
 
The English approach to the creation of jury directions provides a valuable model for the 
creation of similar directions in an Irish context. Although there is no equivalent of the 
Crown Court Bench Book in Ireland, it should be possible to create a publication along these 
lines for use in sexual offence trials. The most appropriate body which should be tasked with 
the role of developing such a publication would seem to be the Judicial Studies Committee of 
the interim Judicial Council. If such a bench book were introduced, Irish trial judges would 
be provided with ample guidance as to how to direct juries so that they are less inclined to 
rely on stereotypical attitudes about sexual offences and that they fully understand what is 
necessary for a legally valid consent to sexual activity. However, by permitting trial judges to 
tailor the illustrations and guidance to suit the individual case before them, trial judges would 
be permitted to use their discretion so that warnings were given in the format which is most 
appropriate for the case at hand. At the same time, trial judges would be sufficiently guided 
so as to avoid cases like R v D where trial judges would stray from issuing guidance to juries 
and instead make controversial statements which run the risk of creating counter-stereotypes. 
Thus, the overall effect of the jury directions proposed here is that juries would receive the 
optimum and most appropriate guidance, allowing them to make more dispassionate and 
enlightened assessments regarding the defendant’s guilt.  
 
Of course, all of the foregoing will be bolstered by judicial training, which would educate 
judges on how best to instruct jurors. Admittedly, at present the availability of judicial 
training in Ireland is limited, largely due to budgetary concerns.42 Currently governed by the 
Judicial Studies Committee of the interim Judicial Council it appears that such training is 
limited to an annual one-day conference and attendance at other general conferences.43 
However, hopefully once the Judicial Council is places on a permanent statutory footing44, 
such training should be more straightforward to implement and more funding may be made 
                                                          
42 The lack of available funding for judicial education and training is cited on the Association of Judges of 
Ireland website: http://www.aji.ie/supports/judicial_education (last accessed: August 20, 213). 
43 http://www.aji.ie/supports/judicial_education (last accessed: August 20, 213). 
44 The Judicial Council Bill 2010 has yet to be implemented into law. 
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available and appropriate training to bolster the judicial directions recommended here will be 
possible.  
  
Conclusion 
As with any other actor in the criminal justice system, trial judges are not infallible. We 
cannot expect them to blindly guide jurors in an area as difficult and controversial as sexual 
offences. The law must support them in their task of getting directions right and ensuring that 
jurors are not prejudiced by RMA but likewise are not prejudiced by an inappropriate 
comment which goes too far in the opposite direction and risks contravening the fair trial 
rights of defendants. The judicial directions proposed here provide a suitable compromise. 
Trial judges are aided in their task of guiding the jury but at the same time they retain 
sufficient freedom to tailor the directions as they see fit, thereby minimising any intrusion 
upon judicial discretion. Consequently, the bench book proposed here is a worthwhile 
initiative either as a stand-alone measure or as part of a wider reform of sexual offences law 
more generally.45   
 
                                                          
45 Minister Alan Shatter has recently announced that the Department of Justice has been engaging in a review of 
Irish sexual offences law (http://www.inis.gov.ie/en/JELR/Pages/SP12000300: last accessed: 20th August 2013)  
and the Taoiseach has promised that a sexual offences Bill will be published this year 
(http://www.kildarestreet.com/debates/?id=2013-05-28a.309&s=sexual+offences#g349: last accessed: 20th 
August 2013). 
